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.MILITARY JUSTICE, COMMAND, AND
THE FIELD SOLDIER
ALBE.T

R. MuGEL*

It was recognized from the beginning by the committee that a
only an instrumentality of
the commander was as abhorrent as a system administered entirely by a civilian criminal court was impractical.
system of military justice which was

We were convinced that a Code of Military Justice cannot ignore the military circumstances under which it must operate but
were equally determined that it must be designated [sic] to administer justice.
These were the words of Professor Edmund M. Morgan,
Chairman of a Committee appointed by the late Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal to draft a code of military justice applicable to all of our armed services.1 The proposal of this committee became the basis of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
as finally approved by Congress.2 Now that the Code has been
in operation for nearly two years, it is opportune to inquire as
to the sufficiency of the design in the light of its administration.3
In former years when our military establishment comprised
less than two hundred thousand men who had voluntarily subjected themselves to military control by enlistment, and even in
the wartime universal call to service, with the recognition of the
inherent inequity required by the exigency of battle, the public
concern for the workings of the military courts was at most
sporadic. But today with the growing realization that a long
range defense program will require the subjection of most young
men to a period of military service, even in peacetime, the public
concern can be expected to be acute. It is even more important
than this. Unless the American public can be satisfied that a basically sound system of military justice is in the making, it very
well may be impossible to have a consideration on the merits of
such plans as Universal Military Training, or alternatives, as
providing an adequate system of defense. The actions of the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo, School of Law. Professor
Mugel served as an Army line officer in combat both during World War II and the

Korean conflict.
1. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on
H. R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 605 (1949).
2. Pub. L. No. 506, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. c. 169 (May 5, 1950), 50 U. S. C. c. 22
pars. 551-736. Hereinafter it will be cited as U. C. M. J.
3. The new Code became operative on May 31, 1951. U. C.M.3. Art. 140 §5.
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military courts transcend the military experience. Possible sentences include the deprivation of life, confinement beyond the
term of enlistment or other required service, and discharges that
may affect citizenship rights and disqualify a man from civilian
employment. America will not easily allow its youth to be funnelled through this jeopardy without an observable assurance of
justice.
,r
Beyond this, military command should be the first to appreciate that the maintenance of military morale in peace time is
most difficult, and that an effective ready force requires respect
for the service, which in turn cannot exist without the confidence
that fair treatment is accorded to the most obscure soldier. The
willing acceptance of military service by the youth of this country
as a responsibility to our heritage of freedom and justice, which is
so vital to the strength of our defense, can ill be achieved unless
the feeling of this heritage permeates the period of service to the
extent recognizably practical.
Mfilitary justice in this country has for many years presented
a strange anomaly. On the one hand the system seems to be remarkably solicitous of the accused person, providing a procedure
that on its surface grants him protection against unjust accusation, acknowledges the principles of fair trial in the American
tradition, and allows a number of opportunities of review of convictions that exceeds the most liberal of our civilian court systems.4 On the other hand it is susceptible to an extreme type of
criticism, the documentation of which on its surface is shocking to the sensibilities of the most insensitive person 5.
A person unfamiliar with the problems of the military commander finds the conduct of the military courts system an easy
target for vehement censure. But the difficulty is that the same
person probably would be willing to go farther and condemn the
entire mihtary establishment as being unfair. The practice of
saluting is readily ridiculed in the living room, the very idea of
rank and its privileges is abhorrent to the principles upon which
4. The self satisfaction of the military is characterized by the statement of a
member of the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps:
Let it be said at the outset that probably no one accused of a crime in
any state or federal jurisdiction is given more opportunity to assert his
innocence or more privileges bf appellate review than one convicted by courtmartial. Landman, One Year of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
A Report of Progress, 4 STAN. L. REv. 491, 492.
5. See Farmer and Wels, Command Control-orMilitary Justice, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rv. 263 (1949); Keeffe & Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 CORN. L. Q. 151
(1949); Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 38 GEo. L. J. 521 (1950);
Keefe, Drumhead Justice: A Look at Our Military Courts, THE Ra.Eans DIGEST (Aug.
1951).
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our nation was founded, and such things as close order drill may
well be viewed as outward marks of regimentation. But saluting
is more than "a form of military greeting," rank is more than
privilege, and drill is more than a symbol. The problems of the
military commander are unique and his responsibilities have no
civilian counterpart. Military tradition has developed tools to
meet these problems and responsibilities, and no alternatives are
offered by the critics of the military. The commander jealously
guards his concept of military courts to protect the entire military
system whch he feels would be equally vulnerable to the tenor of
the attacks.
The standards of civilian criminal procedure cannot be applied
absolutely to military courts. In a case involving misbehavior
before the enemy, 6 a civilian criminal lawyer would consider it
absolutely essential to a fair trial to have a change of venue from
the combat zone. But the trial must be held on the spot, as the
military operation cannot be halted to permit witnesses to testify,
and the trial cannot be delayed, for death, wounds and rotation
make witnesses quickly unavailable. More delicate is the suggestion that injustice may be calculated as inherent in the situation. A case of misbehavior before the enemy may well involve
a psychosis, but such a diagnosis on the battlefield may cause an
epidemic. The fact is that even cowardice, as reprehensible as it
is, does not involve criminality in the civilian sense, and an attempt
to transpose civilian standards of culpability to it is impossible.
But these are combat situations, and it may well be argued
that the military ought not be allowed to hide behind the exigencies of battle to avoid rebuke for failure to meet an adequate
standard of procedure in the conduct of courts-martial within the
United States or with troops in garrison or on occupation duty.
6. In the most publicized court-martial of the Korean conflict, that of the Negro
Lieutenant Leon Gilbert, (CM 343372, 9 B. . &J. C. 183), the trial was held within
500 yards of the front line, and during recesses the members of the court joined in
fighting off the enemy. .The Army Board of Review and Judicial Council found no
reversible error in this fact.
7. There is no provision for a motion for change of venue of courts-martial, nor
is it recognized. (Johns, CM 317064, 66 B. R. 169). A challenge to the array is also
not possible. The challenge of the panel for cause could be accomplished only by challenging each member individually, and each challenge would be voted on by the other
members. (Stuart, CGCMS 19348, (B. R.) 4 C. M. R. 476). Convening authorities' practice in the combat zone of appointing members of the court entirely from the regiment
of the accused, while having some practical justification, should be discouraged. The
Court of Military Appeals may find .ultimately that in such a situation involving probable
hostility there is "general prejudice" as discussed later in this article. It is assumed
that the Court of Military Appeals would weigh the indication of probable hostility
against the practical considerations of the convening authority. Defense counsel, feeling
that there is a peculiar bias of the court-martial, should cautiously build his record b.
individual challenges, and by formal indication of his objection to the panel.
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It is pointed out that "before the enemy" cases make up a relatively small part of the total tried by courts-martial. There is a
great deal of merit to this argument, but it must be observed that
there are several offenses in garrison that do not involve criminality in the civilian sense-such as disrespect of superior
officers or non-commissioned officers, and disobedience. These
offenses too must be punished to protect the system as a whole,
and as there is no civilian equivalent, there can be no absolute
correlation of military and civilian justice. But beyond this, the
military commander's career is not neatly divided between garrison duty and combat with the enemy. ris work in garrison is
to prepare troops to meet the enemy; in fact, the only justification
for his military existence is the preparation for and engagement
in battle. The military commander cannot be expected to develop
a double standard for his sense of justice. It would be sufficient if
he would develop a single satisfactory one.
As much as we may understand and appreciate the position
of command, the fact remains that public confidence in the system
is essential, and the members of our armed forces must have
respect for and faith in their military courts. 'Unfortunately, it
must be reported that the latter presently is not the fact. The
question then is as to whether there now are forces in action that
can reasonably be expected to restore the public confiden.ce in
military justice, and prove the integrity of the system to present
and prospective military personnel.
HESTORY OF REFORM
The principal focus of the complaints against the system of
military justice is on what has been popularly called "command
control." It is not the feeling that great numbers of innocent
persons are being tried and convicted by courts-martial, but that
the system as such makes "justice" the instrumentality of the
commander without sufficient safeguards against arbitrary and
tyrannical flouting of individual rights which we have long considered available to even the most obviously guilty.8
Command control at its source is the system by which the
commander appoints an investigating officer to examine into the
truth of the charges that have been preferred,9 then reviews the
8. In 1946 the Report of the War Department Committee on Military justice

stated a finding that "although the innocent were not punished, there was such a disparity
and severity in the impact of the system on the guilty as to bring many military courts
into disrepute both among the law-breaking element and the law-abiding element, and
a serious impairment of the morale of the troops ensued where such a situation existed."
REP. OF W. D. ADv. Comm. oN Mu.. Jus. 6 (1946).
9. U.C.M.J. Art. 32.
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findings of the investigating officer, and refers the charges to a
court-martial, the members of which, including the law officer,
the prosecuting counsel, and the defense counsel, have been
appointed by him from his command. 10 The commander then
reviews the findings of the court-martial as to correctness in law
and fact, 1 and exercises clemency as to the sentence imposed. 2
When it is understood that all these persons are under the commander's disciplinary jurisdiction, it can easily be seen that the
system permits the subjugation of the court to the will of the
commander. When it is recognized that the court-martial was
originally conceived as an instrument of discipline, 3 it is not
surprising that many commanders are disposed to mold the
system to their own desires, and to treat the modern procedure
designed to protect the rights of the accused as the unfortunate,
though possibly necessary, evils of compromising with civilian
meddlers. The result is often a mockery of justice. 4
10. U. C. M. J. Arts. 22, 26, 27. The accused is entitled to defense counsel of his
own choosing (U. C. M. J. Art. 38), but in many situations this is more theoretical than
real. In an overseas command the accused practically could select only from military
personnel, and the military person selected could serve only if found reasonably available, usually by the commander appointing the court. The question of availability of
military personnel for court duty has been held to be within the discretion of the commander and not subject to review. Hiatt v. Broum, 339 U.S. 103 (1950). The new
Court of Military Appeals has held that there need be no showing by the government
of "unavailability", but that the accused must affirmatively show availability. U.S. v.
Davis, 7._ U. S. C.M.A. , 2 C. .R. 8 (1952).
It is not in the nature of the
military establishment for the accused to be able to show "availability" of the person
he selects to defend him. See also, Dixon (B. R.) I C.M. R. (AF) 594. In Hatteberg,
CM 231963, 18 B. R. 349 (1943), two officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department sat as regular members of a court-martial, but an officer not a member of the
Judge Advocate General's Department sat as law member. The Board of Review held
that the failure to appoint a member of the judge Advocate General's Department as
law member was equivalent to a finding that none was available, despite the fact that
two sat on the very court as regular members, that "availability" was within the sole
discretion of the appointing authority, and that the court was properly constituted.
11. The commander is required to refer the record of trial to his staff judge
advocate for an opinion, U. C. M. J. Art. 60, but he is not compelled to follow that advice
in his action. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, (hereinafter cited MCM) 1951, par. 85c.
12. U. C. M. J. Arts. 64, 71. The tacit policy of command as to sentencing and
clemency will be discussed later in this paper.
13. See I WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 53 (1886): "(T)hey
[courts-martial] are in fact, simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided
by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding
the Army and Navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or
those of his authorized military representatives." Winthrop was used as the text on
military law in the education of most of the officers presently exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction.
14. The Court of Claims in passing upon a claim for back pay of a second lieutenant who, acting as defense counsel for an enlisted man, demonstrated a mistaken
identification of the accused, and as a result was court-martialed himself and dismissed
from the service, stated:
A more flagrant case of military despotism would be.hard to imagine. It
was the verdict of a supposedly impartial judicial tribunal: but it was
evidently rendered in spite against a junior officer who had dared to demonstrate the fallibility of the judgment of his superior officers on the court
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The suggested reforms of the system of military justice have
moved from two approaches. The first has been the suggestion
that the rights of the accused should have safeguards outside the
military. The ultimate extremists would turn over jurisdiction
of military offenses to civilian courts. The obvious impracticality
of this prevents it from being taken seriously. But somewhat
more reasonable has been the position that our federal courts
should have jurisdiction to review court-martial convictions at
least so far as to insure the extension of due process in the constitutional sense. Still more moderate has been the proposal that
has been adopted: that of setting up an ultimate court of appellate
review comprised of civilian judges. The military had set up as
its first line of defense the argument that the requirement that
the. secretaries of departments of the service be civilians was
sufficient civilian control.
The second approach to reform of the system of military
justice has been the suggestion that the safeguard against command abuse be provided within the military by separating the
court function from command. This would be accomplished by
the complete separation of the Judge Advocate General's Department from normal channels of command, and turning over to it
the responsibility for military justice. The proposal can be best
stated in the words of retired Marine Corps General James
Snedeker:
The disease could be torn out at its roots by the establishment
within the armed services of a legally trained group which would
be officially independent of troop commanders. One of the tenets
upon which our country was founded was that of an independent
judiciary. That basic concept can be moulded to fit the armed
services of our country. The commander could arrest an offender, investigate the offense, order the offender tried, and control the prosecution. The administration of military justice
should be in the hands of a legally trained corps concerning the
duties of which the troop commander makes no reports, gives no
who had, indeed, made them look ridiculous. It was a case of almost complete denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights. It brings great discredit upon
the administration of military justice." Shapiro v. U. S., 69 F. Supp. 205,
207 (1947).
In Betts v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825, 826 (1948), the United States District Court of
Kansas, in passing upon habeas corpus proceedings involving a man convicted by courtmartial, stated:
He could not have received due process of law in a trial in a court before
men whose judgments did not belong to them, who had not the will nor the
power to pass freely upon the guilt or innocence of this petitioner's offense,
the offense for which he was charged. It cannot stand the test of fundamental justice. It may have been prompted by the exigencies of war, but
it cannot stand in the light of cold reason and justice as we love it and for
which this petitioner was fighting when he was arrested.
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comments, and exercises no control whatever.

The members of

the court-martial could be appointed by the area representative
of the Judge Advocate General from a panel of available officers

and men in the area. The defense counsel could be chosen from
the members of the legal corps. The work of the members of
the court-martial and of the defense counsel should never be
allowed to come to the attention of the troop commander. Good
justice never has had a bad effect on discipline.

The two do not

even overlap. Discipline delivers the accused for trial;
15 justice
then takes over for the trial and possible punishment.
A very much more moderate proposal has been that, while the
court function remain with command, the Judge Advocate General's Department members be separated from command down to
and including the rendering of efficiency and effectiveness reports.
The even more timid proposal is the one that has been adopted
for the Army; that is, that the court function remain with command, and command continue to render efficiency and effectiveness
reports on Judge Advocate personnel, but that members of the
Judge Advocate General's Department perform their duties under
the direction of the Judge Advocate General, that its members be
assigned by the Judge Advocate General, and that its members
be authorized to communicate within the, Judge Advocate General's Department without going through command channels.' 6
The Army also has set up a separate promotion list for Judge
Advocate General's Department officers. In addition to this it has
been provided that the commander shall not censure, reprimand,
or admonish those performing judicial functions, and that he not
attempt to coerce or influence judicial action, and that it shall
be a court-martial offense to violate these provisions. 17 Anyone
who has confidence in this latter provision as preventing the
influencing of courts greatly underestimates the resourcefulness
of command. Subtle suggestions of courses of conduct can
easily be accomplished by assignment prerogatives, by efficiency
reports, and by the atmosphere of military life in general. Foolish.
as well as brave, would be the junior officer who would bring
charges against his commander on such a tenuous line.
The separation of the court function from command has been
proposed ever since the end of World War I when it was specifically submitted as a part of the Chamberlain Bill.' 8 The Bill died
in committee. Public apathy followed until a furore arose as
veterans returned from World War II. Several committees to
15. Snedeker, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 38 GEo. L. J.521, 525-6 (1950).

16. Pub. L. No. 759, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 24, 1948).
17. This also was enacted in 1948, but is now contained in the Uniform Code

of Military Justice, Arts. 37, 98.
18. S. 64, I.1 367, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
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investigate, study, and report were appointed, including the
Vanderbilt Committee for the Army and the Keefe Board for the
Navy. A clemency board was also established by the War Department to review all sentences of army general courts-martial where
the accused was still imprisoned. The Vanderbilt Committee
recommended the divorcing of military justice from command
control, by the creation of a separate Judge Advocate General's
Corps having an organization similar to the Medical Corps within
the Army. 9 The War Department opposed this, and drafted its
own reform bill without incorporating such provisions. This bill
was suddenly attached as an amendment to the National Defense
Act of 1948 on the floor of the Senate, and was passed on the
assurances of Senator Ken that it contained the reform provisions recommended by the American Bar Association and the
Vanderbilt Committee.2 0 It has become known as the Elston
Act,2 and contained the provisions mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. The Navy counterpart of this bill was never brought
out of committee. In view of unification legislation, the Secretary
of Defense then appointed a committee primarily for the purpose
of drafting a Code of military justice that would be applicable
uniformly to all the services. 22 With some amendments this committee's proposals became the Act of May 5, 1950, entitled the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 3
The new Code represents a compromise of the demands for
reform, in view of the vehement objections of the military services
to the separation of the courts system from command function.
It should be understood that the principal effectiveness of the
new Code is in providing a system of military justice applicable
uniformly to all of the armed services. To the greatest extent
it patterned procedure on the Army system, including many of
the provisions of the Elston Act. But it contained two extremely
important innovations. The first, and most important, was the
provision for a court of appellate review made up of three civilian
judges, having all the characteristics of an independent judicial
body, and known as the Court of Military Appeals. 24 The second,
was the separation of the law officer of a general court-martial
19. REP. WAR DEP'T. ADVISORY ComxrrTEE, MILITARY JUSTICE, 10. (1946).
20. 94 CON G.REc. 7754 (June 9, 1948).
21. Supra n. 16.
22. The Committee was composed of Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Chairman,
Asst. Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney,
and Asst. Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert. The personnel selected for the
Committee suggests that its main purpose was unification, but it was instructed to
provide full protection of the rights of individuals without unduly interfering with
military discipline and functions.
23. Supra n. 2.
24. U. C. M. J. Art. 67.
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from court membership, and his establishment in a position
equivalent to a judge.25 Previously the law officer was designated
as "law member" and retired with the regular court members to
vote on the verdict and the sentence. His instructions were not
given in the presence of the accused nor were they a matter of
record. This change is important as it brings into open court the
instructions on the law by the law officer so as to provide some
check on the propriety of the considerations of the court. The
law officer is required to instruct the court on the elements of the
offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of probf.8
He rules upon interlocutory questions, other than challenges, and
his rulings are final, except on motions to dismiss or questions of
the accused's sanity.27 The Elston Act had departed from the
prior rule of the Articles of War whereby the law member's ruling
on any interlocutory question, other than admissibility of evidence
in a limited sense, could be upset by a vote of the members of the
court.2" The law officer is required to be a lawyer, the previous
"if available" limitation of the Articles of War having been
removed by the Elston Act. 9 But the separation of the law
officer from court membership and the placing of him in the
position equivalent to a judge is of even greater importance in
the effect it should have of increasing the prestige of law and
justice in a setting that has been overpowered by the atmosphere
of military discipline.2 0
It is unfortunate that the creation of the Court of Military
Appeals by the Uniform Code of Military Justice has been widely
viewed as intended to be merely an answer to the problem of
command control 3 1 It may well be that, but it is a great deal more.
It is only in the light of the broader significance of the new court
that the importance of its functions can be evaluated, and the
effectiveness of its work appraised. In the larger sense the Court
of Military Appeals may fill a gap in our overall protection of the
rights of our citizens due to the peculiar position of the serviceman arising from the uncertainty of the extension of constitutional
rights to him, and the difficulty in finding a forum outside the
25. U.C. M.J. Art 26.
26. U.C. M. J. Art. 51 (c).
27. U. C.M. J. Art. 51 (b).

As to motions for a finding of not guilty and

questions of the accused's sanity, the initial ruling of the law officer may be objected
to by any member of the court, in which event the question will be decided by vote of

the court in closed session.
28. A. W. Art. 31, as amended by Act of June 24, 1948, supra n. 16.
29. A. W. Art. 8, as amended by Act of June 24, 1948, supra n. 16. As to the possibility of subverting the requirement by utilizing the "if available" proviso of the A. W.
Art. 8, see Hatteburg, supra n. 10.
30. The extent to which this has been accepted in spirit by the military is
discussed later in this paper.
31.

(1950).

Cf. INDEX AND LEGISI.ATION REPoRT, UNiFoRm
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military to enforce them. While the need for this protection may

be more acute due to the possibility of command interference with
the military courts, it is extremely unfair to ascribe the total need,
or even a major part of it, to command influence. Questions of
constitutional rights and the extension of procedural due process

are frequent and difficult in civil tribunals, and there is no reason
why military courts should be immune from the equivalent questions even in the absence of the slightest command control.

In

many instances where constitutional protections have been held
not applicable to personnel before military tribunals, or where
applicability is uncertain, Congress has indicated clearly the intention that the equivalent protection be provided. Understanding
of the degree to which the ultimate responsibility for the extension
of this protection rests with the Court of Military Appeals, requires

a recognition of the enormity of the preexisting gap.
The Constitution expressly deprives members of the armed
forces of only one of the safeguards generally accorded all
persons; that is the requirement of presentment or indictment of
a grand jury before being held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime.32 However, Article I of the Constitution
grants to Congress the power to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces,3 3 and Article II provides that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States. 4 At an early date the
Supreme Court held that courts-martial are established under
these provisions, rather than under Article III providing for the
judiciary-3 Thus, both the matter of the availability of the procedural safeguards of the Constitution to personnel tried by
courts-martial, and judicial reviewability of courts-martial proceedings were thrown into question.
It is relatively clear that certain of the guarantees of the Constitution do not apply to persons tried before military courts.
The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is unavailable on the
theory that military tribunals are created under the authority of
the executive branch of the government to carry out legislative
action in providing the rules for government of the armed forces,
or in waging war, or providing for the common defense, and that
the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to jury trial in those
situations where it was extended by common law, but not in those
32. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger . . ." U. S. CoNsT. A-MEND. V.
33. Art I §8.
34. Art. II §2.
35. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 CU. S. 1857).
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situations where by custom no jury trial was provided.8 In a
sense the panel of members of a court-martial resemble a jury,
and the provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
separating the law officer from the panel increases the likeness,
but when thought is given to the manner of appointment of the
members the resemblance ends. The direction of many reform
movements indicates the envisionment of an approach to the
civilian concept of a jury. At the conclusion of World War I, it
was suggested that a proportion of the members of the court be of
the same rank as the accused. This has been adopted to an extent
by the amendment made in the Elston Act and carried over to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to the effect that upon written
request of the accused at least one third of the court will be composed of enlisted men appointed by the convening authority. 7
The suggestion that members of courts-martial be appointed by a
representative of the Judze Advocate General from a panel of
officers and men available in the area 38 moves closer to the jury
concept. However, from the nature of the military establishment
it is apparent that it is impossible to devise a system whereby the
accused will be tried before a jury of his peers. The realistic
recognition of this fact emphasises the importance of appellate review.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Ex parte Quirin3 9 used broad
language to indicate that the exception of "cases arising in the
land and naval forces" refers to all the protections offered by
the Fifth Amendment, and, by implication, extends to deprive a
person brought to trial before a military tribunal of the rights
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.40 This was picked up
by Judge Frank of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
who states: "The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are, of course,
inapplicable to a court-martial." '4
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
at times have assumed otherwise. The double jeopardy provision
of the Fifth Amendment was apparently considered applicable to
36. Ex parte Quinrn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
37. A. W. Art. 4, U. C. M. 3. Art. 25 (c). This has been one of the most abortive
attempts at reform. The custom of command, when such a request is made, is to
appoint senior non-commissioned officers who have a reputation as severe disciplinarians.
In any event the enlisted man on a court-martial is even more susceptible than an
officer to influence of high ranking superiors. The inadvisability of maling such a
request now is well known to the soldier, and is usually confirmed by the advice of
defense cotmsel, so that very seldom do enlisted men serve on courts-martial. This
attempted reform has done considerable harm. The soldier bitterly resents the perversion of a provision intended to help him.
38. Supra n. 15.
39. Supra n. 36.
40. Id. at 40.
41. Innes v. Crystal, 131 F. 2d 576, 577 n 2 (2d Cir. 1943).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
courts-martial in Wade v. Hunter,42 although the Supreme Court
held that it was not violated in that case. The due process provision of the Fifth Amendment has been regarded by several
courts as protecting persons before military courts." The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: "The guarantee of
the fifth amendment that 'no person shall . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' makes no
exceptions in the case of persons who are in the armed forces.
The fact that the framers of the amendment did specifically except
such persons from the guarantee to the right to a presentment
or an indictment of a grand jury which is contained in an earlier
part of the amendment makes it even clearer that the persons in
the armed forces were intended to have the benefit of the due
process clause."" But the Court went on to indicate that the due
process required was the conduct of the "military procedure" in
a "fundamentally fair way."43
The primary reason for the uncertainty of the extension of
the procedural guarantees of the Constitution to courts-martial
has been the preliminary difficulty in finding a forum outside the
military to review the proceedings. The Uniform Code of Military
Justice specifically provides, as the Articles of War previously
had, that the court-martial proceedings and review provided by
the Code shall be final and conclusive and shall be binding upon
all departments, courts, agencies and officers of the United States. 4
The Supreme Court had previously confirmed the frequent holding
that civilian courts could not review the correctness of a finding of
guilt by a court-martial.47 The only possible bases for review by
civilian courts were that the court-martial was not properly convened,48 or that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over the
person,49 or lacked jurisdiction over the offense 50 or that the
sentence was beyond the jurisdiction of the court-martial to
impose.51 The usual, and practically only, manner of raising such
questions in civilian courts is by writ of habeas corpus,8 2 although
42. 336 U. S. 684 (1948).
43. Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F. 2d 435 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 697;
Innes v.Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944),; Shita v. King. 133 F. 2d 283 (8th Cir.
1943) ; Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946) ; Shapiro v. U. S. supra n. 14;
Betts v. Hunter, supra n. 14.
44. Innes v.Hiatt, supra n. 43 at 666.
45. Ibid.
46. U. C. 1. J. 76. A. W. 50 (h) as amended by Act of June 24, 1948.
47. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365 (1902).
48. U. S. v. Smith, 197 U. S. 386 (1905).
49. Hershburg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949).
50. Smith v.Whitney, 116 U. S. 167 (1886).
51. Swaim v.U.S., 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
52. See Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 VAND. L. REv.
288 (1953); Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus, 49 MIcH. L. R. 493 (1951; Pasley,
The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial, 12 U. or Pinrs. L. R. 7 (1950).
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a suit in the Court of Claims for back pay is possible.53 The
Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that "by habeas corpus
the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over
the proceedings of a court-martial; and that no mere errors in
their proceedings are open to consideration. The single inquiry,
the test, is jurisdiction.'"4
A possibility of review of court-martial proceedings insofar
as the question of due process is concerned arose with the announcement by the Supreme Court in 1915 that jurisdiction, even
though it had existed, could be lost through the denial of constitutional rights in the course of the proceedings." It was on this
theory that the questions of the extension of constitutional protections to persons tried by court-martial were decided by civilian
courts.5 6 However, in 1950 the case of Hiatt v. Brown came before
the Supreme Court. 57 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had affirmed the District Court in sustaining a writ of habeas
corpus, and had stated that the record was "replete with highly
prejudicial errors which have manifestly operated to deprive the
petitioner of due process of law." 5 The Supreme Court reversed,
stating in part :
The Court of Appeals also concluded that certain errors committed by the military tribunal and reviewing authorities had
deprived the respondent of due process. We think the court was
in error in extending its review, for purpose of determining compliance with the due process clause, to such matters as the propositions of law set forth in the staff judge advocate's report, the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain respondent's conviction, the
adequacy of the pretrial investigation, and the competence of the
law member and defense counsel.

Cf. Humphrey v. Smith, 336

U. S. 695 (1949). It is well stated that "by habeas corpus the
civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the
proceedings of a court-martial. . . . The single inquiry, the
test, is jurisdiction." In re Urimley, 137 U. S. 147, 150 (1890).
In this case the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person ac-

cused and the offense charged, and acted within its lawful powers. The correction of any errors it may have committed is for
the military authorities which are alone authorized to review its
decision. In re Yamashita, 327 UT. S. 1, 8-9 (1946) ; Swaim v.
United States, supra, 165 U. S. at 562.
53. Shapiro v. U. S., supra n. 14.
54. In re Grinley, 137 U. S. 147, 150 (1890).
55. Frank v. Mangum., 237 U. S. 309 (1915); see also, Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S.
114 (1944).
56. See cases n. 43.
57. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
58. 175 F. 2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949).
59. Supra n. 57 at 110, 111.
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While this holding may merely mean that the specified errors
of the court-martial are not such as to deprive the accused of due
process, it may portend that deprivation of due process is not a
jurisdictional question for review of courts-martial proceedings by
writ of habeas corpus. The latter possibility may not be unfortunate, as habeas corpus is hardly an adequate or appropriate
method of assuring that courts-martial provide basic constitutional
guarantees. In any event it was opportune that the enactment of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice creating the Court of
Military Appeals coincided with the Supreme Court action in
Hiatt v. Brown. The new Court enters an arena in which there
is great confusion as to whether constitutional guarantees extend
to servicemen, and grave doubt as to whether there is an adequate
forum outside the military available to make certain that what
rights exist are, in fact, extended to the members of our armed
forces. But this much is clear; Congress by its enactments has
indicated its intention that in most cases, and in some form, our
military personnel be accorded the same, or equivalent, protection
to that accorded the civilian populace.6 0 The Court of Military
Appeals is the appropriate, and perhaps only, vehicle by which
compliance can be assurred.

COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
The significance of the new Court of Military Appeals may
be placed in three areas:
(1) As an ultimate court of appellate review. As such, the
Court enjoys the unique position of being able to start from
scratch in developing a modern and model series of principles of
criminal law and evidence. It is unfettered by legal fictions,
narrow precedents, or out-dated formalism. On the other hand it
has the wealth of the experience of state, federal, and foreign
courts from which it can pick and choose in evolving an enlightened, progressive system of criminal and evidentiary law." In
this aspect the opportunities of the Court are great.
(2) As filling the void in providing the equivalent of constitutional guarantees to members of our armed services. The mandate
of the Congress is clear, but the task of fitting principles of justice
into the exigencies of military operations is arduous. In this
aspect the responsibilities of the Court are heavy.
60. For a discussion of these rights as affected by the Uniform Code of Military
justice see, Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 38 GEo. L. R. 521, 535549, 559-564 (1950) ; Comment, 28 TEx. L. R. 651 (1951).
61. It is heartening to note that members of the Court enthusiastically recognize
this fact. See Foreword by Judge Brosman, Symposium on Military Justice, 6 VAND.
L. Ray., 166 (1953).
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(3) As a supervisory body required to survey the operation
of the system of military justice and to make recommendations."

It is apparent that a major concern of the Court in this capacity
must be the elimination of command influence over courts-martial,
and the securing of acceptance by all echelons of command of the
spirit as well as the letter of the Uniform Code of MKilitary
Justice. 3 In this aspect the problems of the Court are many.
The present Court of Military Appeals is composed of Chief
Judge Robert E. Quinn, former Governor of Rhode Island, Judge
George W. Latimer, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Utah,
and Judge Paul W. Brosman, former Dean of Tulane University
Law School, all of whom were appointed from civilian life, as
required,6 4 by the President with the confirmation of the Senate.
Chief Judge Quinn served with the Navy as a legal officer during
World War II, while Judge Latimer was an Army line officer,
and Judge Brosman was a Judge Advocate with the Air Force.
The branch, and type of duty, of the Judges in their previous
military experience, if kept in mind while reading their opinions,
is quite illuminating.
A mandatory review by the Court of Military Appeals is
provided as to affirmed convictions of general or flag officers or
where the sentence is death, or cases forwarded by a. Judge Advocate General. 5 The accused, in any other case, may secure a
review only upon petition and on good cause shown.66 All reviews
by the Court of Military Appeals are conditioned upon nrevious
review by a board of review, constituted by a Judge Advocate
General.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
While the military services were forced back to their secondary line of resistance to civilian encroachment by the provision
for the Court of Military Appeals, they were able to halt the
onslaught initially at the outpost position of restriction of review
to matters of law.6 7 However, an outpost is always vulnerable,
and while the enemy may not be able to occupy it, the position
62. U.C.M.J. Art. 69 (g).
63. The Court has rendered its first annual report for the period from May 31.
1951, to May 31, 1952. It indicated that not sufficient time had elapsed to make overall
recommendations. The only major recommendation made was that the power to adjudge
punitive (bad conduct) discharges no longer be extended to special courts-martial.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALs AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE AR=.D FoRcEs, 1952.

64.
65.
66.
67.

U.C.M. 3. Art. 67 (a).
Id. Art 67 (b) (1),(2).
Id. Art. 67 (b)(3).
Id. Art. 67 (d).
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may become untenable. The history of restriction of review to the
law is no exception.
The very first written opinion of the Court of Military Appeals
involved the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the conviction. Probably no court of which so much could be
expected, and indeed, by which so much has been accomplished
in its early operations, has had as convulsive an introduction as
did the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. McCrary.8
This was not so much on the question of the test to be applied in
determining the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of law, as
there are several tests that might have been reasonably adopted
by the Court, but rather as to whether the Court would require
any evidence at all as to an element of an offense.
McCrary was charged with desertion, an offense involving
the intent permanently to remain away from his organization.6
The only evidence introduced on the trial was an extract copy of
the unit Morning Report, which remarked that the accused's status
changed from "duty" to "absent without leave" from his organization on October 23, 1950.0 It was stipulated that the accused
surrendered to military authorities in Alabama on December 22,
1950. This was typcial of the "one-minute" court-martial for
AWOL or desertion. Where does proof of intent to remain away
permaently appear? Judge Latimer, writina' the opinion, stated
that the court-martial could have taken judicial notice of the
Korean conflict; noted from the Morning Report that the accused
was a member of an overseas replacement squadron, located at
Camp Stoneman, California. which could be Judicially noted to be
near San Francisco, which in turn could be iudicially noted to be
a port of embarkation for overseas duty and finally that it could be
inferred that the accused knew these facts. From this. and the
fact that accused was absent 60 days and surrendered 2000 miles
distant from his organization, the court-martial could have found
the intent permanently to remain away.
There was no indication ;n the record of the case that the
court-martial had taken judicial notice of these facts, nor could it
have been determined that the accused was not a member of the
permanent compliment of the replacement snuadron. The inference drawn from imminent overqea- combat duty may be questionable as showing intent to remain permanently away. Most
68. - U.S.C.M.A. - 1 C. .R. 1 (1951).
69. U. C. M. J. Art. 85. McCrarv was charged under A. W. 58, as the offense
occurred before the new Code became effective.
70. Morning Renort entries are admissible as an oflicial record made in regular
course of business. MCM, 1951, par. 144 (b).
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disturbing, however, was the considerable emphasis placed by
Judge Latimer in his opinion on the accused's failure to explain
his absence as permitting the inferences to be drawn. And of
great importance was the announcement by Judge Latimer to the
effect that he intended to adhere strictly to the restriction of the
Court's power of review to questions of law, and that if there is
any substantial evidence to support a finding of guilt, in the
'absence of other error, the Court would support the finding.
Judge Brosman wrote a separate concurring opinion indicating his satisfaction with the sufficiency of the evidence, without
reference to the accused's failure to explain, and without discussing the broad principles of review stated by Judge Latimer.
But the Chief Judge in his dissent let out a ringing cry to
rally his forces. He strongly condemned any use of the accused's
failure to testify as giving aid and comfort to the prosecution's
case. He then announced his liberal principle of review of sufficiency of the evidence by clearly stating the "reasonable hypothesis" rule

".

.. there must be substantial evidence consistent

with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of
innocence."' r That, in fact, is the test indicated by the Mlanual for
Courts-Mvartial. 71 Judge Latimer had recognized this rule merely
as providing guidance for the trial forum, and refused to consider
it on appellate review.73
The cry of Chief Judge Quinn did not go unheeded, and in the
next case sharply raising the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence Judge Brosman joined with him and wrote the opinion
for the majority. In United States v. ONeal,7 4 which has become
the leading case on the subject, Judge Brosman adopted the
reasonable hypothesis rule and applied it in reversing a conviction.
Referring to the McCrary case, he stated:
However, we shouldnot have said there [McCrary case],we did

not intend to say there, nor did we say there, that their administration by such agencies is above and beyond the supervision of
an appropriate appellate tribunal-by this Court, although limited to "action only with respect to matters of law." To hold the
converse would effectively deprive appellate courts, including
this one, of any sort of effective control over subordinate elements of the judicial scheme in an important area of law administration.75
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Supra n. 68 at 12.
MCM 1951, par. 74 (a) (3).
Supra n. 68 at 4.
U. S. C. M.A. -, 2 C. M.R. 44 (1952).
Id. at 49.
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Chief Judge Quinn noted a separate concurrence, indicating
that he thought the opinion of the McCrary case had stated otherwise, and Judge Latimer wrote a dissent indicating clearly that in
the McCrary opinion he had intended otherwise. Judge Latimer
expressed his fear that the Court was reviewing the facts contrary
to the provision of the Code.
The O'Neal case has been followed by the Court since its
announcement.

In United States v. Shu1l,76 and United States

Petersolb7 United States v. Ferretti,8 and United States v.
v.
Knah,79 the Court has applied the reasonable -hypothesis test,
reversing in the former two cases, and affirming in the latter two.
It is to be noted that these cases involved the charge of desertion,
which requires the showing of intent. The problem of the sufficiency of the evidence is rendered particularly difficult in military
cases because of the unusually large number of offenses involving
the mental element, which, of course, can only be established by
circumstantial evidence. Desertion, wilful disobedience, and cowardice all fall into this category, and are unique to military law.
Cowardice in fact may involve proof of motive: that the misbehavior was impelled by fear.
The extent to which the Court of Military Appeals will review
the findings of the court-martial is best illustrated by the case of
United States v. Yarborough and Marshal." Marshall was
charged with intentionally wounding himself, Yarborough with
allowing himself to be wounded, and both with conspiracy and with
misbehavior before the enemy by cowardice by reason of the same
acts. The testimony showed that they were members of a company
that was on the line in Korea, although they were headquarters
personnel, and in a position 2,000 yards behind the line. During
the afternoon of the day involved, they discussed, in the presence
of others, ways of shooting themselves without being detected.
They also talked about going to Japan, and Marshall picked up
a carbine and pointed it at Yarborough's foot. Yarborough said
"Go ahead, I don't give a damn." Another soldier said that he'd
better not, as such accidents were being investigated by the Criminal Investigation Division. Both accused said that it made no
difference to them, that they were going to Japan that evening,
and that they didn't care how they got there. Later in the evening
they simulated wounding themselves by overlapping their feet
and pointing a carbine at them, so that if fired it would pass
76. - U.S.C. M.A.,
77. U.S.C. M.A.,
78. U.S.C. M.A.,
79. U. S. C. M. A.
80. U. S. C. M. A.

2 C.M.R. 83 (1952).
3 C.M.R. 51 (1952).
3 C.M.R. 57 (1952).
C. M. R. No. 605, decided Dec. 31, 1952.
-,
C. M. R. No. 443, decided Sept. 12, 1952.
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through the foot of each. They continued to discuss ways that they
could wound both of themselves with a single bullet. An hour later,
and in the presence of another soldier, Marshall placed the index
finger of his right hand over the big toe of Yarborough, who was
lying in his tent, and was watching Marshall. Marshall placed a
carbine so that the muzzle was an inch from his finger, the carbine
discharged, and Marshall was wounded in his finger, Yarborough
in his toe. Yarborough acted surprised when he was wounded.
The witnesses indicated that there was always joking discussion
among the soldiers of the command about wounding themselves,
and that they had believed that Marshall and Yarborough had
been joking. In defense, Marshall and Yarborough testified in
their own behalf. Marshall admitted discussing shooting himself
and Yarborough, but denied statements that he intended to go to
Japan. He testified that he was merely moving the carbine in the
tent when it accidentally discharged. Yarborough, too, admitted
discussing wounding himself, but said he was merely resting in the
tent, when the carbine was fired. He denied that he was watching
Marshall. The court-martial convicted both men of all counts and
sentenced them each to dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture of
pay, and ten years confinement at hard labor.
The Court of Military Appeals reversed the finding of guilt as
to Yarborough -on all charges, and reversed the finding of guilt
of misbehavior by cowardice as to Marshal. However, it affirmed
the findings of guilt as to Marshall on the other charges. Chief
Judge Quinn, writing the majority opinion, cited United States v.
O'Neal,81 and listed several possible hypotheses: that Marshall
intended to fire, and Yarborough intended he should; that Marshall
intended to fire but that Yarborough did not intend to get shot;
that Marshall was "play-acting" and did not know that the
weapon was loaded; or that Marshall's account was correct, the
carbine being accidentally discharged while being moved. He
discarded the last hypothesis, as the court-martial could have disbelieved Marshall's story, which was inconsistent with that of
other witnesses. He stated that only the first hypothesis would
support the court-martial finding in toto. As to Yarborough he
found that there existed reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and
that the overt act alleged to support the charge of conspiracy as
to:him was not-proved. As to Marshall, he stated that it might
not be reasonable to believe that Marshall, an experienced soldier,
would assume that the carbine was not loaded, and that Marshall's
own account of the incident was inconsistent with any other, reasonable hypothesis of innocence. However, to support the charge
81. Supra n. 74.
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of misbehavior before the enemy by cowardice in committing the
acts as alleged, it was necessary to find that the acts were done
through fear. There was no evidence that Marshall was motivated
by fear, said the Chief Judge, "It is just as reasonable to assume
that, sated with fighting, he was motivated by the desire to obtain
a respite."
. Judge Latimer dissented on the reversal of
the conviction of
Yarborough, pointing out that the matter of belief or disbelief of
the inconsistent stories is a function of the court-martial.
This is not only an example of the extent of judicial review of
the facts in determining sufficiency as a matter of law; it is a
penetrating illustration of the, difficulty involved in a military ease.
The Court of Military Appeals has indicated in the cases
involving the sufficiency of the evidence that it intends to fulfill
its appellate function. In adopting the reasonable hypothesis rule
as to sufficiency of the evidence it is being progressive and is
offering the presumption of innocence in its full effectiveness.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS OR THEIR
EQUIVALENT
Though Congress had clearly indicated by the Uniform Code
of Mlitary Justice that most of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution should be extended to service personnel regardless
of the state of the law preexisting, that battle was not won by the
mere preparation of a plan. The argument still was available that
these provisions are directive rather than mandatory on courtsmartial; that if there is sufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then error, whatever it be, is not prejudicial to the
accused.
The Court of Military Appeals lost no opportunity to indicate
that it intended to implement the plan of Congress by requiring
adherence to the safeguards provided. United States v. Gla/y82
involved the relatively minor offense of disorderly conduct, but
the president of the special court-martial trying the accused failed
to instruct the court as to the presumption of innocence, and the
court-martial convicted. The Navy board of review affirmed the
conviction, noting that there was error in the failure to charge
as to the presumption of innocence, but finding that there was
sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption and therefore
holding that the error was not prejudicial. However, the Court
of Military Appeals did not view it as a question of whether the
82.

- U.S.C. M.A.

, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
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accused was innocent or guilty, but rather as to whether the
accused had been accorded a trial on the question of his guilt or
innocence. And in reversing the board of review, the Court of
Military Appeals took occasion to indicate where it stood on the
matter of the guarantees and safeguards of the accused. Judge
Latimer, in writing the opinion of the court in which all concurred,
stated:
(W)e look to the acsts of Congress to determine whether it has
declared that there are fundamental rights inherent in the trial
of military offenses which must be accorded to an accused before
it can be said that he had been fairly convicted.
There are certain standards in the njilitary accusatorial system which have been specifically set by Congress and which we
must demand be observed in the trials of military offenses. Some
of these are more important than others, but all are of sufficient
importance to be a significant part of military law. We conceive
these rights to mold into a pattern similar to that developed in
federal civilian cases. For lack of more descriptive phrase, we
label the pattern as "military due process" and then point up
the minimum standards which are the framework for this concept and which must be met before the accused can be legally
convicted. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, supra, contemplates that he be given a fair trial and it commands us to see
that the proceedings in the courts below reach that standard.
Generally speaking, due process means a course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been
established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement
and protection of private rights. For our purposes and in keeping with the principles of military justice developed over the
years, we do not bottom those rights and privileges on the Constitution. We base them on the laws as enacted by Congress.
But, this does not mean that we cannot give the same legal effects to the rights granted by Congress to military personnel as
do civilian courts to those granted to civilians by the Constitution or by other federal statutes.
As we have stated in previous opinions, we believe Congress
intended, in so far as reasonably possible, to place military justice on the same plane as civilian justice, and to free those accused by the military from certain vices which infected the old
system. Believing this, we are required to announce principles
consistent therewith.83
Then the Court designated some of the rights paralleling those
accorded to defendants in civilian courts which it considered Congress had granted to the accused before a military court:
83. Id. at 77.
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(1)

To be informed of the charges against him.
(2) To be confronted by witnesses testifying against him.
(3) 'To cross-examine witnesses for the government.
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

To challenge members of the court for cause or peremptorily.
To have a specified number of members compose a general and special court-martial.
To be represented by counsel.
Not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
To have involuntary confessions excluded from consideration.

(9)

To have the court instructed on the elements of the
offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof.
(10) To be found guilty of an offense only when a designated
number of members concur in a finding to that effect.
(11) To be sentenced only when a certain number of members
vote in the affirmative.
(12) To have an appellate review.
The Court was careful to indicate that it did not intend to
make the list all-inclusive. On the other hand, it is to be noted
that the court could have been referring to those protections only
to the extent required by the Code, and not to the full extent
recognized before civilian criminal courts. For example, the right
to confrontation listed by the Court must be considered in the light,
of the provision of the Code allowing depositions in certain cases.8 4

84. U.C.M.J. Art. 49.
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After discussing federal court authority, the Court indicated
its intention to draw from there, where appropriate, in passing on
questions of "military due process":
We can see no good reason why the principles announced in
the foregoing cases85 should not be transplanted into the military system; and, insofar as applicable to our system, we adopt
them. True, we need not concern ourselves with the constitutional concept, but if the denial of these benefits to a defendant
is of sufficient importance to justify a civilian court in holding
that it denied him due process, it should be apparent to a casual
reader that denial of a similar right granted by Congress to an
accused in the military service constitutes a violation of military
due process. By adopting these principles we impose upon military courts the duty of jealously safeguarding those rights which
Congress has decreed are an intergral part of military due
process.88

And finally the Court admonishes commanders and members
of courts-martial:
We may have belabored the importance of the question herein
involved. If so, it is to impress on courts-martial the 7undesirability of short-cutting the plain mandate of Congress.
The Clay case is indeed a milestone in military law. But the
Court of Military Appeals has gone beyond errors in failing to
grant the protection to the accused provided by Congress to require that the spirit as well as the letter of the congressional reforms be complied with. The failure to do this, it labels as "general
prejudice," and considers it reason for reversal. The Court
adopts this principle as ". . . within the sphere of this Court's
effort in the sound content of opposition to command control of
the military judicial process to be derived with assurance from
all four corners of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. ' 88
"General prejudice" is illustrated by the ease of United
States v. Barry.s9 The president of a general court-martial
usurped all the functions of the law officer, ruled on motion, admissibility of evidence, and advised the accused of his
rights. The Court held that this was reversible error, as being
generally prejudicial, a concept charhterized as an "overt departure from some creative and indwelling principle-some
critical and basic norm operative in the area under considera85. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101
(1942); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) ; Uneges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437
(1948).
86. Supra n. 82 at 79.
87. Id. at 80.
U. S. C. M. A. _, 2 C M. R. 118 (1952) at 123
88. United States v. Lee, , 2 CM.R. 141 (1952).
89. -_ U.S.C M.A.
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tion." '0 The Court stated that to allow the president of the court-

martial, who is freely selected by the commander, possibly more
concerned with discipline than law, and almost certainly less well
informed in law, to usurp the "judge-like" functions of the law
officer, is to weaken, if not remove one barrier to command control.9 1
Closely analogous to this principle is the holding of the Court
in United States v. Gordon.2 The accused was charged with attempting to burglarize the home of Brigadier General Lee, and
with burglariing the house of Lieutenant General Edwards. The
accused confessed as to both offenses, and General Lee was in'formed of the confession. General Lee then convened a general
court-martial and referred the charges against the acceused to it.
Thereater, and before trial, the charge of attempted burglarizing
of the home of General Lee was dropped for lack of corroboration
of the confession. The accused was convicted of burglarizing General Edwards' home, and the conviction was reviewed by General Lee, and was approved although the sentence was somewhat
reduced. The board of review affirmed. The Court of Military
Appeals reversed on the ground that General Lee was disqualified
to act as convening authority, as there was such a possibility of
hostility as to materially prejudice the rights of the accused. The
reversal by the Court of Military Appeals would be expected,
but the shocking fact is that a general officer apparently had such
little sensitivity to justice as to think that it was all right, and that
the board of review affirmed, apparently not finding anything in
the "book" that specifically forbade the victim from being the convening authority. This is characteristic of certain boards of review that assume the position a glorified inspector general in
searching the record for technical error rather than the deprivation of overall justice.
The fact is that the Court of Military Appeals has kept faith
with command more than the boards of review in upholding convictions where there has been technical error but the substantial
rights of the accused have not been prejudiced. One of the gravest fears of command has been that an overly technical application
of the Code by the Court of Military Justice would completely disrupt the court-martial process. This has not occurred. The
following are just a few examples of differences in approach of
the boards of review and the Court of Military Appeals. In
United States v. Gilgallon,93 the accused had been convicted by a
90. Id. at 146.
91. Id. at 147.

92.
93.

- U.S.C.M.A.

-

U.S.C.M.A.

., 2C.M.Ih 161 (1952).
,

2 C.M.I.

170 (1952).

MILITARY JUSTICE, COMMAND, AND FIELD SOLDIER
special court-martial and sentenced to be discharged from the
service with a bad conduct discharge, to be restricted to his ship
for two months, and to forfeit two-thirds of his pay for two
months. The Navy board of review held that part of the sentence
was invalid in that the forfeiture was stated in a percentage rather
than in dollars and cents. The Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951,
states that loss of pay shall be stated in dollars and cents." The
Court of Military Appeals held that the court-martial error did
not materially prejudice the rights of the accused, and stated,
"we, of course, wonder why a question shrouded in such simplicity and with no prejudicial impact on the accused should reach
this court." ' In United States v. Lee9" the Navy board of review
reversed a conviction because the trial counsel (prosecutor) had
previously conducted an informal investigation of the offense.
The Court of Military Appeals reversed the board of review.
In United States v. Goodson,9T a conviction was reversed by the
Navy board of review on the ground that the trial counsel of
a special court-martial was a warrant officer and not a commissioned officer. The Uniform Code of Military Justice makes
no such requirement, but the Manual for Courts-Martial indicates that an officer shall be appointed trial counsel."
The
Court of Military Appeals reversed the board of review, holding.
that the rights of the accused had not been prejudiced. In United
States v. Jones,99 the Navy board of review reversed a conviction for failure of the president of a special court-martial
to instruct the court as to the elements of the offense, even though
the accused had entered a proper plea of guilty. The Court of
Military Appeals reversed the board of review.
It is apparent that the Court of Military Appeals has accepted
the burden of securing for the members of our armed services
protection equivalent to that provided to the civilian populace
with a real sense of responsibility both to the accused and to the
military services.
IMPLEMENTATION BY THE SERVICES
The adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may
have established relatively stable battle lines in the administration of military justice, but it did not produce a stalemate. Neither
the Code nor the Court of Military Appeals can achieve the de94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

MCM, 1951, par. 126 h.(1).
Supra n.93 at 172.
- U.S.C.M.A. -, 2 C.M.R. 118 (1952).
- U.S.C.M.A. ., 3 C.M.R. 32 (1952).
MCM, 1951. par. 6.
U. S. C.M.A. - 3 C.M.R. 10 (1952).
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sired results without the full cooperation, in spirit as well as

letter, of the armed services. As Professor Mforgan has stated,
"If the superior officers in the services are determined to exercise improper control over the trial, no safeguard will suffice a.i
long as the trial court is composed of military men.'1 00
As has been previously mentioned, the Uniform Code of Military Justice made an important innovation in the proceedings of
courts-martial by separating the law officer from the court membership. Professor Morgan, testifying before a Congressional
committee, stated, in answer to an inquiry as to the place of the law
officer: "Well, the fundamental notion was that the law officer
ought to be as near like a civilian judge as it was possible under
the circumstances. ' ' I lie also emphasized the intent to strengthen the law officer's power and position in order that he might be
able to make independent decisions on legal issues free from possible influence by court members senior to or more influentially
placed than he. 10 The Court of Military Appeals has several times
remarked as to the similarity of the law officer to the civilian judge.
In United States v. Kietlz,'13 the Court stated: "No one who has
read the legislative history of the Code can doubt the strength of
the Congressional resolve to break away completely from the old
procedure, as far as legislatively possible, that the law officer perform in the image of the civilian judge.' 0°4 And in another case
the Court stated with reference to the law officer: "He is the
external and visible symbol of the law in a process which has long
been characterized as juristic and must be genuinely regarded as
1.,105
such.

100. Morgan, Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L.
REv. 169, 184 (1953).
101. House Hearings on Uniform Code of Military Justice, Committee on Armed
Services, 607.

102. Id. at 671-673.
103. - U.S.C.M.A. - 4 C.M.R. 86 (1952).
104. Id. at 88.
105. United States v. Berry, supra n. 89 at 146.
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These cases involved the function of the law officer and not his
physical position in the court room. Appendix 8 of the Manual for
Courts-Mlartial, 1951, however, provided a diagram of acceptable
seating arrangement as set out below:
GENFmAL CouRT-MAnTiAL

Reporter

t

~eI

o~

ol.I

DCC

The resemblance to a federal district courtroom is plain. But
the Army turns the book and in this instance reads it from its left
side so that the members of the court form the front of the courtroom, and the law officer is relegated to a position the equivalent of
The diagram above is
the prisoner's box in a civilian court.'
merely two dimensional, and so the Army has taken the liberty to
raise the members of the court by constructing a platform under
them, but not showing the same consideration for the law officer.
The law officer sits down and over there at the left of the court
next to the court reporter. The president of the court addresses
him in the same tone as used in requesting the reporter to read
back a question or answer. 0 7
106.
Martial is
having the
107.

The Army is not completely without justification, for the Manual for Courts
inconsistent in its reference to the president as senior officer of the court
duty to preserve -order. MCM, 1951, par. 40 b.
The foregoing is based on the writer's observation of courts-martial in Korea

and Japan in 1951 and early 1952.
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So'this is the "image of a civilian judge," this is the "external and visible symbol of the law.'." It would seem that in tipping the book the Army has spilled much of the prestige of the law
officer and the law, and has made the military rather than the law
the dominant note of a court-martial proceeding.
Undoubtedly the greatest amount of criticism of the conduct
of courts-martial, and certainly the largest number of cases involving errors in failing to extend military due process, arise in
special courts-martial. It is also in this area that command influence has its greatest effect. The special court-martial tries the
less seriouis, though not minor, offenses. Its jurisdiction to sentence is limited to confinement for six months, forefeiture of twothirds pay for six months, and a bad conduct discharge." 8 It
consists of at least three officers, and may be appointed by a regimental or separate battalion commander in the Army and the
corresponding commander in the other services. 10 9 There is no
law officer, and generally neither the trial counsel nor the defense
counsel is a lawyer, though if the trial counsel is a lawyer the defense counsel also must be a lawyer.'
There is no verbatim record taken of the proceedings of a special court-martial unless a
sentence to a bad conduct discharge is contemplated. However,
a summarized record of the trial is prepared by the trial counsel
and authenticated by the president of the court-martial."'
Untrained in law, the president of a special court-martial generally is utterly incapable of ruling correctly on difficult motions,
questions of evidence, and instructing the court on the elements of
the offense." ' But beyond this, the members of the court usually
have no "feel" for due process, and are apt to treat the proceedings as a formal rite. Their proclivity to mistake due to their unfamiliarity with the subject, makes the members of the court extremely conscious of the possibility of incurring the disfavor of
their superiors, and peculiarly susceptible to command influence.
Trial counsel in special courts-martial have been found incipable of properly preparing summarized records, and therefore
printed forms are now provided and mere words and phrases are
filled in to constitute the record. This, of course does not in any
way reflect the real proceedings, and if anything was omitted on
the trial, it il be filled in on the record to avoid reprimand. The
108. U. C. M. J. Art. 19.
109. U.C.M.J. Art 23.
110. U.C. M. J. Art 27 (c).
111. MCM, 1951, par: 83.
112. The writer recalls hearing counsel in a special court-martial reprimanded
by the court -for impertinence in implying criticism.of, the manner in which the court
was observing the case, because he asked the court to take "judiialnotice" of a fact.
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record of a special court-martial generally forms no adequate
basis for appellate review.
The difficulty is that the entirely understandable sins of the
special courts-martial are visited upon the system of military justice as a whole. In complaining about an injustice done to him
by a court-martial the soldier does not differentiate as to what
type of court-martial it was, and the entire system of military law
is brought into disrepute.
In the field of the general courts-martial considerable censure
can be leveled against members of the Judge Advocate General's
Departments for failure of many of them to grasp the full responsibility that has been placed on them by the Uniform Cbde of
Military Justice. Judge Latimer of the Court of Military Appeals
has stated:
From the records I have reviewed since the court opened for
business I have concluded that representation on the trial level
is not of the best, and, in my opinion, if the present act fails to
accomplish the desired reforms it will be largely because of poor
representation on that level. A reviewing tribunal is limited in
its sphere of review and obviously it cannot eliminate the evils
flowing out of unprepared, ill-advised, and careless representation. 113
For some reason, defense counsel often does not accept the
burden of the defense with the sense of responsibility of a civilian
lawyer. Very often defense counsel does not see the accused
except to interview him once before the trial. This is better than
it used to be! Almost invariably the defense counsel fails to
perform an independent investigation. Of course, there is a
reason for this, as in the services the defense counsel's time is not
his own, nor does he have the facilities to conduct an investigation.
One answer to this problem that has been suggested is that the
Judge Advocate General's Departments form a separate defense
corps, with the work of its members under the supervision of a
senior chief defense counsel. However, this involves the personnel
problem of lack of sufficient law trained officers to permit an
economical segregation within the Judge Advocate General's
Departments.
The matter of sentencing persons convicted by courts-martial
has "continued to raise considerable difficulty. The Uniform Code
of Military 'Justice provides, as did the Articles of War, that the
court shall-adjudge the sentence, " and provides for review by the
113. Commencement Address, The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, Jan. 18, 1952.
114. U. C. M.J. Art. 18. 19. 20.
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convening authority."' The reviewing authority may reduce the
sentence but he cannot increase it."' A requisite of fixing sentences either by civilian criminal courts or courts-martial is a
degree of uniformity. The court-martial, in the relative position
of a jury under the new Code of Military Justice, is an inherently
illogical body for fixing sentence, as it cannot achieve the necessary uniformity. The result has been the establishment of a
practice by the courts-martial of imposing unreasonably severe
sentences, in order to allow the convening authority to reduce the
sentence if he desires. 17 Actually this is more than a mere practice of the courts. "It is a rule that in the past has been set down
in no uncertain terms by command, and the officers of the services
continue to be imbued with the-idea. This practice, of course, is
an abdication by the court-martial of a function assigned to it by
the legislature. Even more damaging is the fact that it is generally
recognized by the troops that the practice exists, and to them it
is concrete evidence of the subordination of the courts-martial
to command. The problem is difficult, but it is certain that it
cannot be solved as long as the courts-martial retain the function
of adjudging sentence. It might be possible to extend the similarity of the law officer to the civilian judge by assigning the
sentencing function to him, for sake of achieving uniformity,
with perhaps the right reserved to the courts-martial to make
recommendations, in order to preserve the military judgment on
the seriousness of the offense.
CONCLUSION
One fact should be plain to the military services: Congress
intends to extend fair judicial treatment to the members of the
armed forces. If the present system does not accomplish this,
then any change that Congress will make will be a further deprivation of the control of the military. If the armed services subvert
the purposes of the Code of Military Justice, as they have the
capacity to do as indicated by what has happened to unification
legislation, they will have "fought the problem" and lost the
battle. On the other hand, the armed services have the opportunity to demonstrate that the present system will work without
further drastic divesting of military power over the court system.
The burden of proof would seem to be on the military, and it can
be met only by affirmative efforts to make the present system work.
115. U.C.M.J. Art. 64.
116. U.C.M.J. Art 62.
117. Cf. Weber, CM 274903. The accused was sentenced to be hanged for wilful
disobedience of an order to join his squad for training. The reviewing authority reduced it to 5 years' confinement, and a clemency board reduced it to 334 years' confinement.
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It is also clear that the present system is not' completely
workable in its present exact pattern. Adjustments and improvements are in order, and they may be made at the instigation of the
armed services, or on recommendations of the Court of Military
Appeals, or by Congress acting independently. These adjustments necessarily affect the military in its primary mission; They
should be designed to interfere with the military establishment to
the smallest possible extent. It would seem obvious that the
military, having the greatest familiarity with its problems, is the
most appropriate body to effect, initiate or sponsor the necessary
adjustments.
The Court of Military Appeals, in its supervisory capacity,
has indicated the areas which it presently has under consideration.
It has made one major recommendation :118 that the power to grant
bad conduct discharges be denied special courts-martial. Its
reasons seem impelling, and the Judge Advocates General of the
Army and Air Force agree. The Judge Advocate General of the
Navy and the Treasury Department (Coast Guard) disagree. The
apparent reasons for disagreement" 9 involve problems of personnel and administration rather than justice.
The writer proposes the following, not as recommendations,
but rather as some areas of possible consideration in making adjustments to the present system:
(1) Should ot the special courts-martial and their jurisdiction be taken completely from under the system of military
justice and placed in the area of military discipline as perhaps
"disciplinary boards" ? There is little resemblance in actuality
between special and general courts-martial. Special courts-martial
can never approach the necessary standards of military justice
which Congress has ordained, without a tremendous addition of
law trained personnel, which would not be administratively or
economically feasible. The records of special courts-martial
proceedings are not sufficient for adequate review. The sentences
of the special courts-martial, except the 'bad conduct discharge,
ifemoval of which has been recommended, do not transcend the
normal period of military service. Of course, it is recognized that
some limitation would be required, as coninement time is not
"good" time in computing the period of service. The presence
of the special courts-martial under the tent of military justice
serves only to bring into question the integrity of the entire
system.
118. Supra n. 63.
119. See Ward, U. C. M. I-Does it work?, 6 VA.xD. L. REv. 186, 211-216, 224-5
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(2) Should not the- general articles of "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer,' ' 20 and "Conduct of a nature to bring discredit to
1

the service,"12 be removed from the punitive articles of the Code,

and placed in the jurisdiction of disciplinary boards as indicated
in (1) above? These articles do not set out an offense with
sufficient definiteness to meet the standard of equivalent civilian
justice. If the offense is serious it should be chargeable under
one of the specific articles, or the specific articles should be expanded to set out with sufficient definiteness any such serious
offenses. The possibility of conviction by courts-martial under
such vague articles reflects discredit upon the system of military
justice.
(3) Should not the provision for mandatory review by the
Court of Military Appeals in the case of conviction of a general
or flag officer be removed? There are few such cases, and a likelihood that review would be granted in what cases there are. The
matter of the rank of the accused has no special place where
justice is involved. The present provision has little importance,
but it "reads badly" in its inconsistency with principles of justice.
(4) Should not the functions and position of the law officer
be clarified and extended to give him the title of "Judge," the
duty of presiding over the courts-martial, and the sentencing
function on the recommendation of the court?
(5) Should not a defense corps be established within the
Judge Advocate General's Department, under the supervision of
a Defense Chief and with full responsibility for the conduct of a
proper defense by assigned counsel? The savings of legal personnel by eliminating the special courts-martial from the system
of military justice as indicated by (1) above should make this
feasible.
There is great encouragement to be derived from the present
picture of military justice, not the least of which comes from
the indication of civilian interest in the subject. The subject of
military law and the workings of the Court of Military Appeals
provide perhaps the best study in jurisprudence of our times.
Beyond this the subject is vital to our national survival.

120. U. C. M. J.Art 133.
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